AI · 18 Nov 2026 · 16:02 CET
‘Just Ridiculous’: A Famed Philosopher Takes on AI Consciousness

Publisher preview · OZZZER analysis pending editorial review.
PUBLISHER ARTICLE PREVIEW
From the original article
Over 50 years ago, philosopher Thomas Nagel asked the question, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The question opened up an examination on whether people could understand the consciousness of nonhumans and the meaning of consciousness itself. Who knew that, a half- century later, the question would move from an ivory-tower rumination to a critical issue in the future of humanity as we try to make sense of disturbingly sentient-adjacent chatbots?
The paper became a classic and it helped set a foundation for a career that saw Nagel make contributions to thought on morality, justice, and the mind-body question. One of his books is entitled, What Does It All Mean? For the breadth and quality of his work, he became the recipient this week of the $1 million Berggruen Prize for Philosophy & Culture, given annually to “an individual whose ideas have profoundly shaped human self-understanding and advancement in a rapidly changing world.” Previous winners include Peter Singer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
I used the occasion to speak to Nagel at his home in Greenwich Village, specifically to hear about how the evolution of artificial intelligence might have affected his viewpoint. It turns out that the 89-year-old university professor emeritus at NYU had given the question a lot of thought and had some strong views on the subject.
The interview is edited for clarity and length.
It’s been 52 years since you wrote “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” which has become an iconic paper about understanding consciousness in non-humans. Has the emergence of large language models altered your thinking?
Like everyone, I’m tremendously impressed by the lifelikeness of these systems compared to the history of earlier AI. But the disposition of some philosophers to take seriously the question whether these things are conscious or might soon become conscious is just ridiculous. They are assuming that the physical substrate is irrelevant. They all think that the material conditions for consciousness can be given in functionalist terms.
For those of us who have forgotten our philosophy classes, tell us about functionalism.
Functionalism is substrate independent. It’s more than likely that the truth is one which links physical processes and systems of certain kinds to mental phenomena. Complicated data centers have absolutely nothing in common with the physical character of a nervous system. We have strong reasons to believe that while there may be consciousness elsewhere in the universe, it would require the appearance of some kind of organism with something analogous to a nervous system.
But isn’t all consciousness subjective?
Source
WIRED AI · 18 Nov 2026 · 16:02 CET
Open the original at WIRED AI ↗